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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we take a glimpse at the dark side of bank accounting statements 
by using a mathematical law which was established by Benford in 1938 to detect data 
manipulation. We shed the spotlight on the healthy, failed, and bailed out banks in the global 
financial crisis and test whether a set of balance sheet and income statement variables which 
are used by regulators to rate the performance and soundness of banks were manipulated in 
the years prior to and also during the crisis. We find that banks utilise loan loss provisions 
to manipulate earnings and income upwards throughout the examined periods. Together with 
loan loss provisions, problem banks resort to a downward manipulation of allowance for 
loan losses and non-performing loans with the purpose to tamper earnings upwards. We also 
provide evidence that manipulation is more prevalent in problem banks, which manage 
income and earnings to conceal their financial difficulties. Moreover, manipulation is found 
to be strengthened in the crisis period; it is also expanded to affect regulatory capital. Overall, 
banks utilise data manipulation without yet resorting to eye-catching manipulation strategies 
that may attract the scrutiny by regulators. Benford’s Law appears to be a suitable tool for 
assessing the quality of accounting information and for discovering irregularities in bank 
accounting data. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     Accounting standards and financial reporting systems are deemed as largely contributing to the 
transparency of the operation of the entire financial system by providing regulators, supervisors, 
equity holders, investors and other market participants with timely, accurate, and high-quality 
information on the financial condition of banking institutions. Bank managers, chief executives, 
and board members, however, have incentives to misrepresent the financial performance of their 
banks over time, covering losses or increasing earnings with the utmost purpose to convey a 
sounder picture of their companies’ business to the public and to the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities than the actual one. The performance-based remuneration schemes that were widely 
adopted in the banking industry in the years running up to the late 2000s financial crisis provided 
officers and executives with additional incentives to implement data manipulation practices.  
     The crisis that began to unfold in the mid-to-late 2007 brought to light a number of financial 
accounting misreporting problems in the banking sector. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)’s push to step up its policing of accounting fraud has lately led to a surge of 
cases and investigations, as officials again target cooking-the-books offenses that were once a 
staple of its workload. The upturn, the SEC’s first year-over-year increase in such enforcement 
actions since 2007, came as the agency returned its focus to alleged financial reporting and 
disclosure cases that might have gone unpunished as crisis-era misconduct dominated its attention 
lately.  
     As of year-end 2009, the First National Community Bancorp (FNCB)’s investment portfolio 
included certain pooled trust preferred securities. Based on the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), FNCB was required to report in its financial statements the amount of 
impairment on the securities in its investment portfolio. FNCB’s methodology for determining the 
amount of impairment did not comply with GAAP and, hence, the bank was caught understating 
the losses in 2009 and 2010.1 To continue, as part of its acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
(hereafter, Merrill) on January 1, 2009, Bank of America Corp. (hereafter, BAC) assumed a $52.5 
billion portfolio of structured notes and other relevant financial instruments that Merrill issued. At 
the time of acquisition, BAC recorded the notes at fair value, which was a $5.9 billion discount to 
the notes’ par value due to an adverse change in Merrill’s creditworthiness. By the early 2014, 87 
                                                 
1 See: SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement, Release No. 3622/January 28, 2015. 
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percent of the notes had either matured or been repurchased by BAC. Because BAC recorded the 
notes at a discount to par when acquired, BAC realised losses on the notes upon their maturation. 
To calculate regulatory capital, BAC was required to deduct the realised losses on the notes as they 
occurred. From the early 2009 through the first quarter of 2014, however, BAC failed to deduct 
certain realised losses on the notes when it calculated and reported its regulatory capital, implying 
that capital was overstated in all regulatory filings that it made with SEC from 2009 to 2013.2 In a 
similar vein, Fifth Third Bancorp. failed to record substantial losses during the crisis by not 
properly taking into account a portion of its commercial real estate loan portfolio. In the third 
quarter of 2008, the bank decided to sell large pools of non-performing commercial loans. When 
the bank board decided to sell the loans, GAAP required the firm to reclassify them from “held for 
investment” to “held for sale” and to carry them at fair value. Because the fair values of those loans 
were significantly below Fifth Third’s carrying values, classifying them as “held for sale” would 
have resulted in a $169 million impairment. This would, in turn, have increased the pre-tax loss of 
the bank in the third quarter of 2008 by 132 percent.3  
     Auditors, on their side, have rather failed to raise the alarm to bank regulators in the years prior 
to and also during the crisis. FDIC sued PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for $1 billion for not 
detecting a massive accounting fraud that brought down Colonial Bank in 2009. The FDIC lawsuit 
blamed PwC for missing huge holes in Colonial’s balance sheet without ever detecting the 
multibillion-dollar fraud at Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., which was Colonial’s largest 
client. Furthermore, two KPMG auditors recently received suspensions for failing to scrutinise 
loan loss reserves at TierOne, which also failed during the crisis. Subsequently, TierOne reported 
$120 million in unforeseen losses after the real-estate collateral securing a vast portfolio of 
mortgages was found to be largely overvalued on the company’s books. Moreover, just eight 
months prior to Lehman Brothers’ demise, Ernst and Young’s auditors remained silent about the 
repurchase transactions that disguised the bank’s leverage.  
     In sum, numerous accounting violations have lately engulfed the U.S. banking system and 
several institutions are currently under investigation by regulators for these violations. Although 
they have received a little attention in the relevant literature so far, poor accounting data quality 
                                                 
2 See: SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement, Release No. 3588/September 29, 2014. 
3 See: SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement, Release No. 3514/December 4, 2013. 
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and weak disclosure practices as combined with data manipulation in the financial services 
industry are considered to have contributed to the propagation and prolongation of the recent crisis. 
In this paper, we rely on a mathematical law which was established by Benford in 1938 to detect 
data tampering in bank accounting data. We test whether a set of fundamental balance sheet and 
income statement variables, which are widely used by regulators to rate the performance and the 
soundness of banks were manipulated in the years prior to the outbreak of the crisis and also during 
the crisis. The idea of detecting manipulation in accounting data by tests of conformity to Benford's 
Law has been mainly applied in the corporate finance literature and, more recently, in the 
economics literature as we discuss in Section II. Our study contains the first application of the Law 
on banking data. Moreover, it is the first study that identifies operational discrepancies and 
uncovers data manipulation practices amongst the failed, bailed out, and healthy banking firms in 
the recent crisis. 
     We report several interesting findings, which are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests we 
conduct. All banks utilise loan loss provisions to manipulate earnings and interest income upwards 
throughout the examined two periods. In the case of bailed out banks, non-interest income is also 
found to be manipulated upwards in both periods. Together with loan loss provisions, the set of 
problem (failed and bailed out) banks resorts to a downward manipulation of allowance for loan 
losses and non-performing loans with the purpose to tamper earnings upwards. Furthermore, our 
results provide comprehensive evidence that manipulation is more prevalent in problem banks, 
which manage income and earnings upwards by delaying loan loss provisions as well as loss 
allowances and non-performing loans in order to conceal their financial difficulties. Moreover, 
manipulation is found to be strengthened in the crisis period; it is also expanded during this period 
as banks are found to implement upward manipulation practices on their core regulatory capital. 
     Overall, we document that banks utilise data manipulation to disclose an artificially improved 
view of their performance to authorities, investors, and to the public without yet resorting to eye-
catching manipulation strategies that may attract the scrutiny by regulators. Importantly, Benford’s 
Law appears to be a systematic tool, suitable for assessing the quality of accounting information 
and for discovering irregularities in bank accounting data. 
      The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes Benford’s Law, whereas Section 
III presents the relevant literature. The empirical analysis and the discussion of the results of the 
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application of Benford’s Law to our data set follow in Section 4. Section 5 performs a series of 
robustness checks and, finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
     II. THE BENFORD’S LAW 
     In 1881, Newcomb observed that the initial pages of a book of logarithmic tables were more 
worn than the latter pages. He also observed that numbers with first digit of 1 were observed more 
often than those starting with 2, 3 and so on. This led him to believe that, in practice, low numbers 
occur more frequently than high numbers. On that basis, he developed a set of mathematical 
theorems to determine the distributions of numbers appearing in different digital positions within 
naturally occurring figures. He discovered that low numbers possess a larger probability of 
appearing in the first two digital positions within a number compared to high numbers (Newcomb, 
1881). 
     Almost fifty years later, Benford (1938) conducted a study that was focused on the expected 
distribution of digits in tabulated data from numerous natural data sets. More concretely, he 
formulated the expected frequencies for the first and second positions in a number together with 
their combinations and found that, when the data are ranked from smallest to largest, they form a 
geometric sequence. Basically, what Benford (1938) showed was that, in several naturally 
occurring data sets (i.e., data sets which are not contrived by man or machine), the distribution of 
digits do not follow a natural, regularly occurring pattern. This is to say, the leading significant 
digits (mostly those in the first two places of a number) are not uniformly distributed; instead, they 
follow a logarithmic weak monotonic distribution. The distribution of leading digits implied by 
Benford’s Law is described by the following expressions:  
 
                                                  𝑓(𝑖) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(1 + 𝑖
−1),                                                              (1) 
 
and 
∑ 𝑓(𝑖) = 1,                                                                       (2)
9
𝑖=0
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where f(i) stands for the frequency of digit i implied by Benford’s Law being the first or other 
leading digit; i=0, 1, 2,…, 9; and 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 is the base 10 logarithm. Note that the first digit cannot 
take the value of 0, unless the number under scrutiny is a decimal number. Table 1 shows the 
expected frequencies for the digits 0 through 9 to occur in each of the first four digital positions in 
any number. We note that digit 1 possesses a 30.10 percent likelihood of appearing in the first 
digital place within a number, while digit 9 has only a 4.58 percent likelihood of occurring in the 
first digital place. More generally, digit 1 occurs more often than any other number in the first 
position of a number, whereas the frequency of the remaining digits (i.e., from 2 to 9) decreases 
with respect to the value of the digits. Similarly, the probability of digit 0 appearing in the second 
place within a number is 11.97 percent, whereas digit 9 possesses only an 8.50 percent chance of 
occurring in the second place. 
 
TABLE 1 
Benford’s Expected Digital Frequencies 
 
 
Digit 1st place 2nd place 3rd place 4th place 
0  .1197 .1018 .1002 
1 .3010 .1139 .1014 .1001 
2 .1761 .1088 .1010 .1001 
3 .1249 .1043 .1006 .1001 
4 .0969 .1003 .1002 .1000 
5 .0792 .0967 .0998 .0999 
6 .0670 .0934 .0994 .0999 
7 .0580 .0904 .0990 .0999 
8 .0512 .0876 .0986 .0999 
9 .0458 .0850 .0983 .0998 
This table presents the expected frequencies for the digits 0 through 9 in each of the first four places in 
any number based on Benford’s Law distribution. 
 
     The expected digital frequencies for the first and second places based on the Benford 
distribution are graphically presented in Figure 1. The values on the vertical axis reflect the 
distribution probabilities of digits i as shown on the horizontal axis.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Benford’s Law Expected Frequencies for the First and Second Digits 
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This Figure contains a graphical representation of the expected frequencies for the first digit 
(blue line) and the second digit (red line) based on the Benford distribution. The values on 
the vertical axis are the distribution probabilities of digit i as shown on the horizontal axis, 
where i=0, 1, 2,…, 9. 
 
     The Benford distribution is an empirically observable phenomenon, exactly like normal 
distribution. If distributions are selected at random and random samples are taken from each of 
these distributions, then the significant digital frequencies of the combined samplings are expected 
to converge to Benford’s distribution, even though the individual distributions may not closely 
follow the Law. In the context of our research, this means that if the digital frequency in the bank 
accounting data we employ in our analysis departs from the expectations of Benford’s Law, we 
can argue that data may have been manipulated. Or, in other words, that the data have been 
transformed to conceal the true financial condition of the banking institutions that comprise our 
sample.  
 
III. APPLICATIONS OF BENFORD’S LAW IN THE LITERATURE 
     The first application of Benford’s Law in the accounting literature is that of Carslaw (1988), 
which examines the frequency of the occurrence of second digits in income figures of a total of 
220 listed corporate firms in New Zealand. He tests the hypothesis that when income is below 
some particular psychological threshold, managers have the tendency to round it up. His empirical 
findings provide support to his hypothesis since an abnormally high frequency of digit zero and an 
unusually low occurrence of digit nine are documented. Inspired by Carslaw (1988), Thomas 
8 
 
(1989) conducts a study to investigate if the reported earnings for U.S. firms follow similar patterns 
with those of New Zealand firms. His findings suggest similar, though considerably smaller, 
deviations from the expected frequencies for the latter firms, whereas an opposite pattern with 
fewer zeros and more nines than expected is reported for losses. 
     Further research on earnings management based on Benford’s Law is conducted by Niskanen 
and Keloharju (2000), Van Caneghem (2002), and Skousen, Guean and Wetzel (2004) for the 
Finnish, U.K., and Japanese corporate companies, respectively. In this context, Das and Zhang 
(2003) rely on data from the I/B/E/S and the S&P’s Compustat databases to show that firms tend 
to round up earnings per share so that they can meet analysts’ forecasts and achieve their 
predetermined profitability goals. Tilden and Janes (2006) use the Law to investigate the 
occurrence of manipulation practices in corporate accounting data during the economic recessions 
that occurred from 1950 to 2006. They show that data conform to Benford’s Law under normal 
economic and financial conditions. However, in periods surrounding recessions, some reported 
financial statement figures like the allowance for doubtful accounts and the net income fail to 
conform, which is an indication of manipulation.  
     In a somewhat different context, Nigrini (1996) resorts to Benford’s Law to detect tax evasion. 
He investigates a number of tax declarations of American taxpayers and found that people lean 
towards the understatement of their real taxable income. In fact, low-income taxpayers are found 
to be more likely to invent numbers on their tax return. Similarly, Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) 
detect fraudulent data in tax payments and accounting data, suggesting that auditors can test the 
authenticity of lists of numbers by comparing the actual and the expected digital frequencies by a 
recourse to Benford’s Law. Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini (2004) provide further support to the 
importance of the Law in helping auditors to increase their ability to detect fraudulent practices. 
They show that digital analysis conducted on transaction level data rather than aggregated data, 
can assist auditors by identifying the specific accounts in which frauds might reside so that auditors 
can then investigate the relevant accounts in a more depth.  
     Benford’s Law has been lately utilised in testing the quality of macroeconomic data. Gonzales-
Garcia and Pastor (2009) argue that nonconformity with the Law should not necessarily imply 
poor quality of macroeconomic data. They argue that the rejection of the Law may result from 
marked structural shifts in the data series under scrutiny. Brahler, Engel, Gottsche, and Rauch 
(2011) also refer to Benford’s Law to investigate the quality of macroeconomic data reported to 
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Eurostat by EU member states. Similarly, Michalski and Stoltz (2012) resort to the Law to examine 
whether a set of countries misquote the economic data they report to authorities in a strategic 
manner. Abrantes-Metz, Villas-Boas, and Judge (2011) use Benford’s second digit reference 
distribution to track the daily Libor over the period 2005-2008 with the purpose to identify if Libor 
performs its intended price-signalling function. They provide evidence for significant deviations 
of the Libor’s price most noticeably from January 1, 2007 through August 8, 2007. 
     Other studies that also resort to Benford’s Law are those of Ashton and Hudson (2008), which 
examines various patterns of data streams to find instances of interest rate clustering in the UK 
financial services markets; Hales, Sridharan, Radhakrishnan, Chakravorty, and Samia (2008), 
which investigates the reliability of employee-reported operational data by testing the presence of 
the Law in these datasets; Diekmann (2007) that examines whether the first digits of regression 
coefficients published in scientific journals tend to be distributed according to the first digit-law; 
and, Diekmann and Jann (2010) that draws attention to difficulties in using the Law to detect fraud 
in scientific publications, pointing out that, in order to establish the validity of the relevant tests, it 
is required to demonstrate that real data are in agreement with the Benford distribution while 
manipulated data follow some different distribution.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
     This section describes our data set and the accounting variables we employ in our analysis. The 
digital analysis of the conformity of Benford’s Law to our data is also presented and discussed.  
 
Data Period 
     Our data are of quarterly frequency and extend from the beginning of 2003 (2003q1) to the end 
of 2012 (2012q4) when the banking crisis in the U.S. literally came to a halt. We do not examine 
the years prior to 2003q1 for two main reasons. First, on 30 July 2002, the U.S. government signed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth SOX) into law with the purpose to set new or enhanced 
disclosure standards for all U.S. public company boards including those of listed banking firms. 
The bill, which constituted a major regulatory reform, was mainly enacted as a reaction to the 
numerous financial accounting scandals in the years prior to and around 2000 like those of Enron, 
Tyco International, Qwest, HealthSouth, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WorldCom. Under 
SOX, top management executives have to individually certify the accuracy of financial 
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information, whereas penalties for fraudulent financial activity are severe. Additionally, SOX has 
increased both the independence of the outside auditors whose main task is to review the accuracy 
of corporate financial statements and the oversight role of boards of directors. The second reason 
for not examining the data prior to 2003q1 is because the two international financial crises which 
erupted in East Asia and in Russia towards the end of the ’90s combined with the Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in late 1998 and the dot-com bubble crisis of the early 2000s 
all had a considerable destabilising impact on the operation of international financial markets and 
that of the U.S. banking system. 
     The entire data period is divided into two sub-periods: the earlier one (2003q1-2007q3) includes 
the years prior to the outbreak of the crisis, that is before September 2007 when the TED spread 
(i.e., the difference between the yield on the three-month Libor and the yield on three-month U.S. 
Treasury bills) which is one of the most widely-used indicators of credit risk, widened to almost 
200 basis points relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points. The pre-crisis years 
was characterised by stable financial conditions and strong economic expansion. The second 
period extends from 2007q3 to 2012q3 and refers to the crisis period in which financial turbulence, 
uncertainty, and distress prevailed in the economy. It has to be mentioned here that the former 
period follows the major accounting scandals occurring in early 2000s, which largely led to the 
development and implementation of SOX in mid-2002 and the increased scrutiny of financial 
reporting in the U.S. as earlier discussed. On the other hand, the latter period is the period when 
several financial reporting misstatements in the banking industry were revealed.  
 
Data Set 
     We focus on U.S. commercial and savings banking institutions that file a Report on Condition 
and Income (also known as Call Report) and make a clear distinction between non-problem and 
problem banks.4 The former group consists of all the banks that stayed afloat in that they neither 
failed, nor received some financial aid, nor merged with or acquired by some other institution 
during the recent financial meltdown. The banks which failed at some later point in time that is 
                                                 
4 Thrifts -i.e., savings and loans associations- are excluded from our empirical analysis because they file a different 
report (the Thrift Financial Report). With the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act and the establishment of the Office 
of Thrift Supervision in July 2011, all thrifts were required to file and submit a Call Report from March 2012. 
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not covered in our data period -that is, from 2013q1 to 2015q4- are also excluded from our set of 
non-problem banks. Further, the latter group does not contain any institutions that were merged 
with or acquired by some other institution from the onset of the crisis onwards.  
     Problem banks, on the other hand, are those which either failed during the crisis or received 
TARP assistance.  Failed banks are defined as the insured commercial and savings banks that were 
closed requiring disbursements by FDIC from the outbreak of the crisis in 2007q4 through the end 
of our data period. In general, a bank is closed when the regulatory authorities determine that it is 
critically undercapitalised and deem it unable to meet its obligations to depositors and other 
creditors. The key attribute determining undercapitalisation is insolvency, which occurs when the 
bank’s assets are worth less than its liabilities according to either book or market values. Another 
fundamental reason for bank closure is liquidity shortages, which occur when a bank is unable to 
meet its current obligations as they come due. For instance, when depositors expect that a bank is 
very likely to fail, they may withdraw their deposits and precipitate a liquidity crisis at the bank.  
     In the event of a bank failure, the institution’s charter is terminated and some or all of the failed 
bank’s assets and liabilities are transferred to a successor charter. The FDIC acts as a receiver and 
is in charge of the failure resolution process. There are mainly two failure resolution mechanisms: 
the ‘purchase-and-assumption’ and the ‘deposit pay out’. Under the former mechanism, the failed 
banking institution's insured deposits are transferred to a successor institution, and its charter is 
closed. In most of the purchase-and-assumption transactions, additional liabilities (e.g., part or all 
of its uninsured deposits) are assumed by and some or all of its assets are transferred to the 
acquiring bank. The FDIC usually provides assistance to the acquirer most often in the form of 
loan loss sharing agreements. In the case of remaining assets and liabilities, these are liquidated 
and the liquidation costs are internalised. In several purchase-and-assumption resolution cases, the 
acquiring bank compensates the FDIC for the franchise value from the failed bank’s established 
customer relationships, which helps reduce the insurer’s resolution cost. In a deposit payout 
transaction, on the other hand, the FDIC pays the failed bank’s depositors the full amount of their 
insured deposits, the failed bank’s charter is closed, and there is no successor institution. Typically, 
deposit payouts are observed when no other bank is interested in assuming the assets and liabilities 
of the failed bank. 
     In total, for the period starting from 2007q4 and extending to 2012q4, there have been recorded 
449 failures of commercial and savings banks in the U.S. and FDIC has been appointed receiver 
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of all the bankrupt institutions based on the relevant data collected from the FDIC web site.5 To 
give the broad picture of the extent of bank failures in the recent crisis, we indicate that only 30 
banks went bankrupt in the U.S. from 2000q1 through 2007q3. 
     To construct the sample of bailed out banks, we identify all TARP recipients. TARP has been 
the largest U.S. government bailout programme in history. It authorised the Treasury to inject loads 
of capital into banks by purchasing senior preferred shares. Those injections were intended to 
restore the health and increase the soundness of problem banks by helping them to address liquidity 
shortages and strengthen their capital base. Banks were scheduled to repay or redeem the preferred 
stock at an undetermined time, but the programme required them to pay an established dividend 
rate and interest rate to the Treasury as long as the securities were outstanding. 
     We refer to the complete list of TARP recipients which is obtained from the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury. This list discloses the financial institutions that received TARP funds via the 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP) which was the key component of TARP together with the 
respective transaction dates and investment amounts. We trace all commercial and savings banks 
which participated in the programme either directly, or through their parent (bank holding) 
companies. In total, we identify 736 TARP investment transactions excluding any multiple 
transactions, i.e., transactions in which a bank is involved in more than once. Out of these 736 
institutions that received capital injections, 47 were thrifts which, as earlier mentioned, are 
excluded from our analysis. This leaves 689 institutions in our sample, out of which 596 are Bank 
Holding Companies (BHCs) and 93 are commercial and savings banks. We realistically assume 
that if a BHC was approved to participate in TARP, its subsidiary banks would have received some 
fraction of TARP funds. Out of 596 BHCs that participated in TARP, 56 were multi-BHCs, while 
the remaining 540 were mono-BHCs. We match all BHCs to their subsidiary commercial and 
savings banks by hand-matching the relevant information found in the Consolidated Financial 
Statements for Bank Holding Company Report (FR Y9-C Report) to the ‘higher-holder’ codes of 
the examined banks found in Call Reports. By doing so, we obtain a total of 731 FDIC-insured 
banks that received TARP funds via their parent holding companies. We add to this figure the 93 
                                                 
5 The names of the banks, their distribution across the U.S. states and cities, the date that every failed institution ceased 
to exist as a privately-held going concern entity, the estimated assets and deposits of each institution at the time of 
failure, and the cost of every individual failure for FDIC are all available upon request. 
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commercial and savings banks which are not linked to a BHC to construct the final sample of 824 
banks that received TARP support, either directly or through their parent companies.6 
     In sum, we begin with a total number of 8,722 active commercial and savings banking 
institutions that filed a Call Report in 2003q1. We then exclude the 46 banks that went bankrupt 
over the 2013q1-2015q4 period as well as those that were merged with or acquired from some 
other institution through some market deal and not through one of the two failure resolution 
mechanisms described above. We also check the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies 
and we end up with 7,575 banks of which 449 went bankrupt, 824 were bailed out, and the 
remaining 6,302 stayed alive during the crisis. It is important to mention here that, from the 
statistical perspective, the sets of failed and bailed out banks do not intersect with each other in the 
sense that none of the sample banks which received financial assistance did later fail. Apparently, 
this also holds true for the set of non-problem banks with those of failed and bailed out banks. 
 
The Bank Accounting Variables  
     To choose the bank accounting variables to utilise in our empirical analysis, we resort to the 
Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as CAMEL. CAMEL is a vector of five 
different -yet interrelated- measures capturing Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management 
expertise, Earnings strength, and Liquidity. It was introduced by the U.S. authorities in November 
1979 to conduct on-site examinations in order to evaluate the individual performance and the 
soundness of banks and to monitor the conditions in the industry. In 1996, CAMEL evolved into 
CAMELS, with the addition of a sixth component (‘S’) that summarises the Sensitivity to market 
risk.  
     We construct five sets of accounting variables, each corresponding to the key variables used by 
regulators to construct the CAMEL components. We do not account for Sensitivity to market risk 
because this component is proxied by market (and not accounting) variables like the slope of the 
yield curve or the spread in the market interest rates. To measure Capital adequacy, we rely on the 
book equity capital (EQUITY) and the core regulatory capital (TIER 1); for Asset quality, we refer 
to non-performing loans (NPL), allowances for loan losses (LOSSALLOW), and loan loss 
provisions (LLP); Management expertise in measured by total loans and leases (LOANS), total 
                                                 
6 The detailed list of these banks is available upon request. 
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deposits (DEPOSITS), and total earning assets (EARNASETS); the measurement of Earnings 
strength is based on total interest income (INTINC), and total non-interest income (NONINTIC); 
and, lastly, Liquidity is captured by cash and balances due from depository institutions (CASH), 
and by federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase (REPOS). All 
variables, which are shown in Table 2, are based on balance sheet and income statement data of 
quarterly frequency, and are collected from the Call Reports as found in the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago and that of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC) Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Accounting Variables and Data Sources  
 
CAMEL components Variables Abbreviation Data Source 
Capital adequacy 
Book equity capital EQUITY Call Reports 
 
& 
 
Federal Financial 
Institutions 
Examination 
Council (FFIEC) 
Central Data 
Repository's 
Public Data 
Distribution 
Core regulatory capital TIER1 
Asset quality 
Non-performing loans NPL 
Allowances for loan losses ALLOW 
Loan loss provisions LLP 
Management expertise 
Total loans and leases LOANS 
Total deposits DEPOS 
Total earning assets EARNAS 
Earnings strength 
Total interest income INTINC 
Total non-interest income NINTINC 
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Liquidity 
Cash and balances due from 
depository institutions 
CASH 
Federal funds purchased 
and securities sold under 
agreements to repurchase 
REPOS 
This Table presents all the variables that we use in the empirical analysis and in robustness checks. The 
abbreviation of each variable and the sources we use to collect the data are also reported. 
 
     If manipulation occurs in the accounting variables that reflect Capital adequacy (EQUITY and 
TIER1), Management expertise (LOANS, DEPOS, and EARNAS), Earnings strength (INTINC and 
NINTINC), and Liquidity (CASH and REPOS), then this is expected to have an upward trend. That 
is, we anticipate that a bank that resorts to data tampering it does so in order to signal to regulators, 
investors, and to the public a more robust performance than the actual one in terms of capital, 
management, profitability, and liquidity. On the other hand, manipulation in the Asset quality 
variables is expected to be of downward nature in the sense that lower non-performing loans 
(NPL), loan loss allowances (ALLOW), or loan loss provisions (LLP) would convey the picture of 
a less risky and, hence, more sound banking institution to the public. 
 
Digital Analysis 
     We conduct a digital analysis to compare the actual with the expected frequencies predicted by 
the Benford’s Law of the digits zero through nine appearing in the second position of our variables 
of interest. We resort to the normally distributed z-statistics to examine the statistical significance 
of the deviations in the actual and expected proportions, which is computed as follows: 
                                                             𝑧𝑖 =
|𝑝0 − 𝑝𝑖| − (
1
2𝑛)
𝑠𝑖
,                                                                   (3) 
 
where 𝑧𝑖  is the z-statistic for digit i where i=0, 1, 2,…, 9; 𝑝0 denotes the actual (observed) 
proportion; 𝑝𝑖 is the expected proportion based on Benford’s Law; n is the number of observations 
of the examined variable; the term 
1
2𝑛
 is the Yates’ continuity correction term that is applied only 
when its value is smaller than that of |𝑝0  − 𝑝𝑖| to bring normal and binomial probability curves 
into close agreement; and 𝑠𝑖 is the standard deviation of digit i given by: 
  
𝑠𝑖 = [𝑝𝑖 ((1 − 𝑝𝑖)/𝑛) ]
1
2⁄                                                             (4) 
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The z-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the actual proportion does not statistically differ from 
the expected proportion based on Benford’s Law. As the difference between 𝑝0 and 𝑝𝑖 increases 
in Equation (3), the z-statistic becomes larger. A z-statistic of 2.57 indicates a p-value of 0.01, 1.96 
indicates a p-value of 0.05, and 1.64 suggests a p-value of 0.10.  
     An extension of the z-statistic that tests one digit at a time is the chi-square test that is, in fact, 
a ‘goodness-of-fit’ test as it is conducted over all nine digits of the second position of the variables 
under scrutiny. The chi-square test investigates whether the observed distribution significantly 
differs from the expected distribution. In case the chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the probability of all digits conform to the expected distribution under Benford’s Law, then this is 
a strong signal for data manipulation. The value of chi-square is determined through the following 
formula: 
 
𝜒(9)
2 = 𝑛 ∑
(𝜃𝑖 − 𝑓(𝑖))
2
𝑓(𝑖)
9
𝑖=0
,                                                       (5) 
 
where 𝜃𝑖  is the observed frequency of digit i; f(i) stands for the frequency of digit i implied by 
Benford’s Law as noted under Equations (1) and (2); and, n is the number of observations of the 
examined variable. The conformity of the entire distribution is tested, implying that the results are 
summed up for all digits i=0, 1, 2,…, 9. As we focus on the second position of each of the examined 
variables, we have nine degrees of freedom, i.e. 𝜒(9)
2 . The 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
critical values for 𝜒(9)
2  are 14.68, 16.92, and 21.97, respectively. 
     The digit-by-digit analysis based on z-statistics and the variable-by-variable chi-square test are 
complementary to each other. The former is more discriminatory than the latter analysis and spots 
on finding line items that contain possible red flags; in other words, attention is drawn to certain 
digits with peaks. The latter analysis investigates whether the entire behaviour of a variable 
warrants further examination. Hence, it allows statements of the goodness-of-fit for the variable 
under examination as a whole. Z-statistics is used as a supplement to a chi-square test in order to 
reduce the probability of Type I and II Errors. A Type I Error occurs when a variable is not 
manipulated, but it is signaled as it underlies a human intervention. A Type II Error, on the other 
17 
 
hand, occurs when a variable that actually underlies some portion of human intervention is signaled 
as not being manipulated.  
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
     The results of our digital analysis for the second position in each of the CAMEL components 
based on the z-statistic and the chi-square test for the sets of non-problem, failed and bailed out 
banks over the pre-crisis as well as the crisis periods are presented in Tables 3 through 8. If a 
variable does not conform to Benford’s distribution, then the data is likely to have been 
manipulated. If a variable has been manipulated upwards to increase the digit in the first position 
by one, a higher than anticipated proportion of low numbers (mostly zeros or ones) and a lower 
than expected frequency of high numbers (mostly nines or eights) will occur in the second position. 
This describes an uncommon digital pattern that violates Benford’s Law and indicates an upward 
data manipulation. If the reversal pattern holds -more high digits and fewer low digits than 
expected appear in the second position- then data are suspect for a downward manipulation. A 
positive deviation implies that the actual proportions exceed the expected ones, while a negative 
deviation shows that the converse is true. 
 
The Pre-crisis Period 
     We start our discussion by focusing on Tables 3 through 5 that contain the results of the digital 
analysis based on pre-crisis data. The results for non-problem banks as presented in Table 3 show 
that the actual proportion of zeros appearing in the second position of total earning assets 
(EARNAS) and total interest income (INTINC) exceeds the expected proportion by 4.88 percent 
and 5.56 percent, respectively. The reported deviations are both statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. Along the same lines, the actual proportion of ones significantly exceeds the 
expected proportion by 3.74 percent and 3.95 percent, respectively. If we apply the same procedure 
to the remaining numbers (i.e., two through nine) appearing in the second position of EARNAS and 
INTINC, we find that eights and nines produce actual proportions that are significantly lower from 
the anticipated proportions. Deviations for EARNAS are equal to -2.64 percent and -6.08 percent 
for eights and nines, respectively, whereas for INTINC deviations are -2.56 percent and -7.18 
percent, respectively. The goodness-of-fit chi-square test suggests a rejection of the hypothesis 
that the EARNAS and INTINC data are generated by the Benford’s distribution. Taken together, 
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the aforementioned results demonstrate a clear evidence of data manipulation. In specific, results 
show that the banks which remained afloat in the recent crisis, rounded up both EARNAS and 
INTINC in the years preceding the crisis in order to signal to regulators, market participants, and 
other economic agents a more efficient managerial performance and a higher profitability. These 
banks are also found to manipulate loan loss provisions downwards as actual proportions of LLP 
are lower by 4.14 percent compared to the expected proportions for zeros and higher by 4.52 
percent for nines. For the remaining nine CAMEL components we employ in our analysis, all 
digits zero through nine appear in the second position at rates which approximate their expected 
frequencies. In addition, no statistical significant deviations based on z-statistic are reported. 
Consistently, the chi-square test does not provide us with any signal for data manipulation for these 
variables. 
     We now turn to shed the spotlight on the set of failed banks. The results in Table 4 reveal the 
occurrence of large positive (negative) and significant proportional deviations in digits zero and 
one (eight and nine) of EARNAS and INTINC. The magnitude of the reported deviations is larger 
as compared to the relevant deviations observed for the set of non-problem banking firms. Hence, 
a stronger upward manipulation for the Management expertise and the Earnings components of 
CAMEL ratings system for the set of failed banks in the years prior to outbreak of the crisis is 
documented. Importantly, a downward bias is reported for allowances for loan losses (ALLOW) as 
there are more nines (5.74 percent) and fewer zeros (6.82 percent) than anticipated in the second 
digit. The reported deviations are found to be significant at the 5 percent level. In a similar vein, 
loan loss provisions are manipulated downwards since the actual proportion of zeros appearing in 
the second position of LLP is significantly smaller than the expected proportion by 5.71 percent 
and that of nines significantly exceeds the expected proportion by 4.89 percent. We can thus argue 
that the banks that went down during the crisis were inclined to present lower loss allowances and 
loss loan provisions prior to their failure. Both the reported upward manipulation in EARNAS and 
INTINC and the downward manipulation in ALLOW and LLP described above are confirmed by 
the chi-square test. Neither large, nor statistically significant discrepancies between the actual and 
the expected frequencies are reported for any of the remaining CAMEL components.  
     The upward data manipulation practices of EARNAS and INTINC are also confirmed for the set 
of bailed out banks in the pre-crisis era as displayed in Table 5. More specifically, results indicate 
that the actual proportion of zeros appearing in the second position of EARNAS and INTINC 
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exceeds the expected proportion by 6.71 percent and 7.32 percent, respectively, whereas the actual 
proportion of ones exceeds the expected proportion by 3.91 percent and 3.90 percent, respectively. 
As regards eights and nines, these are linked to actual proportions which are significantly lower 
from the anticipated proportions: deviations for EARNAS are -2.61 percent and -8.58 percent for 
eights and nines, respectively, while for INTINC deviations are equal to -3.42 percent and -9.16 
percent, respectively. Interestingly, bailed out banks are found to also apply manipulation practices 
on NINTINC since the actual proportion of zeros exceeds the expected proportion by 8.20 percent. 
Conversely, the actual proportion of nines are less by 7.82 percent compared to the expected 
proportion. Both deviations are significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the pre-crisis 
downward manipulation of loan loss allowances documented for the failed banks is also found to 
hold true for the assisted banks since there are fewer zeros (-6.62 percent) and more nines (6.20 
percent) than expected in the second position of ALLOW and the reported discrepancies are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Bailed out banks are further found to manipulate loan 
loss provisions downwards as actual proportions of loan loss provisions (LLP) are lower by 7.93 
percent compared to the expected proportions for zeros and higher by 7.38 percent for nines. 
Deviations are found to be significant at the 5 percent level for both zeros and nines. The goodness-
of-fit test carried out produce statistically significant results for all the manipulated variables 
(EARNAS, INTINC, NINTINC, ALLOW, LLP).  
 
 
The Crisis Period 
     The digital analysis performed on the pre-crisis sample is replicated on the crisis sample and 
the relevant results are displayed in Tables 6 through 8. We provide evidence of an upward data 
manipulation of both earning assets (EARNAS) and interest income (INTINC) for all three 
examined clusters of banks. The manipulation levels are found to be higher compared to those we 
document prior to the crisis. Indeed, the incidence of zeros and ones in the second position of the 
aforementioned variables increased after the outbreak of the crisis, whereas, at the same time, the 
occurrence of eights and nines is decreased. Moreover, problem banks appear to manipulate 
EARNAS and INTINC to a greater extent compared to non-problem banks. To continue, bailed out 
institutions are found to exert an upward manipulative influence on total non-interest income 
(NINTINC). Manipulation is found to be stronger compared to the manipulation reported in the 
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pre-crisis period. The chi-square test is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels for EARNAS and INTINC and significant at the 5 percent level for NINTINC, thus 
suggesting the rejection of the null of a Benford distribution.  
     As regards the Asset quality component of CAMEL ratings, z-statistic reveals significantly 
negative deviations in digit zero and positive deviations in digit nine for loan loss allowances 
(ALLOW) and non-performing loans (NPL) for both the bankrupt and saved banks. The same 
deviation scheme is reported for loan loss provisions (LLP) for all three banking groups. 
Importantly, the level of downward manipulation is found to be higher for all three Asset quality 
measures in the crisis era. 
     Remarkably, all sample banks are found to apply upward data manipulation practices on the 
core regulatory capital as an excess of zeros and a shortage of nines in the second digit of TIER1 
is reported. In particular, the actual proportion of zeros significantly exceeds the expected 
proportion by 4.98 percent for non-problem banks, 5.82 percent for failed banks, and by 5.32 
percent for bailed out banks. On the other hand, digit nine is linked to actual proportions which 
are significantly lower from the expected proportions by 5.17 percent, 5.48 percent, and by 5.70 
percent for the non-problem, failed, and bailed out banks, respectively. The chi-square test 
confirms the statistical validity of all the aforementioned deviations. Therefore, banks are found 
to signal a stronger capital base than the actual one to regulators and to market participants. 
 
 
Discussion of the Results across the Two Periods 
     Our results suggest that all sample banks utilise loan loss provisions throughout the two time 
periods to manipulate earnings and interest income upwards. Interest income is by far the most 
important source of revenue for commercial banks; it mainly emerges from the interest that banks 
charge on loans and determines the degree of bank profitability to a considerable extent. In the 
case of bailed out banks the majority of which are large and universal institutions that are entangled 
with a very broad range of modern financial activities other than pure commercial banking 
activities like loan granting, the total non-interest income is also found to be manipulated upwards 
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in both data periods.7 Prior research (see, e.g., Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang 2004) indicates that 
bank managers largely use loan loss provisions for earnings management mainly due to motives 
associated with income smoothing, achieving earnings targets, or meeting profitability 
benchmarks. Furthermore, the performance-based remuneration practices which prevail in the 
banking industry for many years now are widely considered as providing the managers and 
executives of banking institutions with strong incentives to manipulate the reported earnings and 
revenues. 
     Together with loan loss provisions, the set of problem banks is further found to resort to the 
downward manipulation of allowance for loan losses and non-performing loans with the purpose 
to manipulate earnings upwards. Under the Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (FASB 1975) 
entitled ‘Accounting for Contingencies’, when credit losses on a loan or portfolio of loans are 
likely and can be reasonably estimated, an expense called loan loss provisions and a contra-asset 
(to earning assets outstanding) called loan loss allowances should be recorded on bank accounting 
books. This is to say, by manipulating loan loss provisions downwards, banks are inclined to 
follow the same or similar strategies with loan loss allowances, and, by doing so, are ‘entitled’ to 
artificially increase the volume of earning assets. Moreover, the reported downward manipulation 
of non-performing loans can be explained by the direct relation that holds between non-performing 
loans and loss provisions. In specific, higher levels of non-performing loans imply troubles in the 
bank loan portfolio and these troubles should be reflected in higher loss provisions (Kanagaretnam, 
Krishnan, and Lobo 2010). 
     In addition, we provide strong evidence that data manipulation is more prevalent in problem 
financial institutions. As regards income and earnings manipulation, it is established in the 
literature that this is more likely to occur when a bank’s future prospects are rather bleak. Indeed, 
weak banks tend to manage income and earnings upwards by delaying loan loss provisions (Liu 
and Ryan 2006) and, in turn, loss allowances and non-performing loans, showing achievement of 
the relevant targets and, at the same time, concealing their financial difficulties. Along the same 
lines, distressed banks are more closely monitored by regulators and, hence, their managers are 
                                                 
7 Fee-based activities are explicitly defined by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and include, amongst others, 
securities dealing and underwriting, financial and investment advisory services, merchant banking, derivatives trading, 
and issuing or selling securitised interests in bank-eligible assets. 
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more anxious in demonstrating to authorities that they can attain the imposed pre-specified 
performance thresholds. Moreover, a crucial prerequisite to obtain TARP assistance was viability, 
meaning that the applicant banks had to prove that they were viable. However, this viability 
criterion was rather loosely defined and was mostly linked to the level of profitability by many 
applicant banks, which they were incentivised to show to Federal assessors higher revenue streams 
and cash flows than the actual ones.  
     Our results reveal that manipulation is magnified after the eruption of the crisis. This is in 
accordance with Tilden and Janes (2012)’s findings of increased financial statement manipulation 
during economic recessionary times. Importantly, all sample banks are found to be involved in an 
upward manipulation of the core regulatory capital during the crisis era. By assumption, a bank 
has strong incentives to show it is not undercapitalised and that its capital is adequate to meet its 
obligations to depositors and other creditors. To the extent that the allowance for loan losses is 
included in regulatory capital, banks can manipulate allowances downwards with the purpose to 
show that a strong capital cushion has been set aside to absorb shocks due to the financial 
turbulence. Also, accounting discretion which is inherent in the current financial reporting rules 
allow banks to manipulate regulatory capital upwards by holding back on loan loss provisioning 
and by keeping their allowances for loan losses from ballooning. That is, in line with Huizinga and 
Laeven (2012), we suggest that banks manipulate their loan loss provisioning to manage their 
regulatory capital after the outbreak of the crisis. 
 
 
 
Patterns of Data Manipulation Practices  
     We can now examine the pattern of data manipulation we have documented thus far. To this, 
we apply the Benford’s Law to the first position of each of the manipulated variables, i.e., 
EARNAS, INTINC, NINTINC, ALLOW, LLP, NPL, and TIER1. Digital analysis is conducted for 
all the three sets of banks and for each of the two periods separately.8 Results, which are very 
similar across the two periods and amongst the three bank clusters, indicate that the actual 
proportion of ones which occur in the first position of EARNAS, INTINC, NINTINC, and TIER1 is 
                                                 
8 For the sake of brevity, the relevant results are not presented and are available upon request.  
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higher than the anticipated and that eights and (mostly) nines are observed less often than expected. 
Conversely, for ALLOW, LLP, and NPL the actual proportion of ones is lower than anticipated, 
while that of nines is found to be higher. All the reported deviations are significant at the 1 percent 
level for digit one, and at the 5 percent level for digits eight and nine based on the values of z-
statistic, whereas the values of the chi-square test reveal significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels.   
     Our results demonstrate that the reported data manipulation pattern is common amongst the 
examined CAMEL variables. In specific, the upward manipulation pattern suggests that when an  
accounting figure starts with either the digit eight or nine is more likely to be rounded up to a figure 
which has a one as the first digit. To give an example, a core regulatory capital (TIER1) of $894 
million is likely to be rounded up to $1.012 billion. In the context of a downward manipulation, 
on the other hand, the reported pattern shows that banks tend to decrease the value of an accounting 
figure when its first digit is one to a figure which starts with the digit nine. For instance, loan loss 
provisions (LLP) of $1.085 million are manipulated downwards to $991,062. Interestingly, neither 
the level of soundness of banks under scrutiny (problem vs non-problem institutions) nor the 
occurrence of the crisis affect the documented manipulation pattern. 
     Our evidence suggests that banks exercise manipulation to increase the magnitude of balance 
sheet (EARNAS and TIER1) and income statement variables (INTINC and NINTINC) when the 
level of these variables is only slightly below a round number. By the same token, banks 
manipulate the balance sheet variables that reflect Asset quality (ALLOW, LLP, and NPL) 
downwards when the level of these variables is slightly above a round number. We can, therefore, 
claim that, in general, banks utilise data manipulation to present an artificially improved view of 
their performance to authorities, investors, and the public, without yet resorting to eye-catching 
manipulation strategies that may attract the scrutiny by regulators, the SEC, or auditors. Still, 
however, manipulation practices transmit noise in the operation of the entire banking sector. On 
the one hand, they distort the expectations of shareholders, investors, and the public about 
individual bank valuations but also about financial conditions in the sector as they provide false 
signals; on the other hand, they mislead regulatory and supervisory authorities in their tasks to 
identify and address any problems in the operation of banks and of the sector as a whole. 
 
VI. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
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     Our digital analysis based on the z-statistic and the chi-square tests has indicated that 
manipulation is likely to occur to some of the bank accounting variables we scrutinise. As a 
robustness test, we resort to Nigrini (1996)’s Distortion Factor (DF) model which indicates 
whether or not data are overstated or understated and also estimates the extent of manipulation (or 
distortion). The DF model compares the mean of the actual numbers in a data set and the mean of 
the expected numbers based on Benford’s Law. Since there is no unique mean for the numbers 
contained in a data set which closely approximates the Law because such a data set consists of 
relatively large or relatively small numbers, Nigrini (1996) suggests to move the decimal point of 
each actual number so that each number would fall into the interval [10,100). More concretely, 
each number that is below 10 is expanded to a number within the range [10,100). Similarly, each 
number that is larger than 100 is collapsed to a number within the range [10,100). For example, 
the number 4.29 expands to 42.9, while the number 1040 collapses to 10.4. A comparison is then 
made between the mean of the set of actual numbers scaled to the [10,100) range and the mean of 
the set of expected numbers that conform to Benford’s Law. 
     The Actual Mean (AM) of the n collapsed or expanded data is given by: 
 
𝐴𝑀 =
∑ 𝑋
𝑛
,                                                                          (6) 
 
where X stands for the collapsed or expanded data values, and n is the number of observations of 
the examined variable. Following Nigrini (1996), the Expected Mean (EM) of the Benford 
distribution is equal to: 
 
𝐸𝑀 =
90
𝑛(10
1
𝑛 − 1)
                                                                          (7) 
 
We can calculate DF as follows:  
 
𝐷𝐹 =
(𝐴𝑀 − 𝐸𝑀)100
𝐸𝑀
                                                                       (8) 
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Equation (8) gives the average percentage manipulation of the examined data. When DF is positive 
(negative), an upward (downward) manipulation is detected. Since AM and EM are the means of 
n random variables, the distribution of DF approaches the normal distribution according to the 
central limit theorem. Hence, the z-statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the AM equals the 
EM can be computed for relatively large n.9 
     In our robustness analysis, we also account for possible selection bias in our data. Towards this, 
we exclude from the group of bailed out banks all the institutions that regulators would never let 
them fail due to their systemic importance. Indeed, authorities injected loads of capital into nine 
U.S. banks under TARP at the very first instance, implying that those TARP recipients did not 
follow the formal assessment process like their peers did. These banks were Citigroup, Bank of 
America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia 
Corporation, State Street Corporation, and Merrill Lynch. By the same token, the biggest bank 
failure, that of Washington Mutual Bank with $307 billion assets, is treated as an outlier and is 
excluded from our set of failed institutions. Washington Mutual was the sixth largest U.S. 
commercial bank when it failed in September 2008. Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, 
Wachovia Bank, Citibank, and Wells Fargo were those five institutions with more assets than 
Washington Mutual Bank. In fact, no other commercial or savings banking organisation with more 
than $100 billion of total assets went bankrupt during the crisis. On the other hand, the smallest 
failed bank held approximately $10 million of assets. By excluding the above ten banks from our 
analysis, we remove the impact of extreme values and outliers on our data. To further enhance the 
robustness of our results, we use the collapse of Lehmann Brothers on 15 September 2008 as a 
breakpoint in our whole data period. Hence, the crisis period commences in 2008q3 instead of 
2007q4.  
     Table 9 presents the DF values in percentage terms for each of the CAMEL components for 
the non-problem, failed, and bailed out banks over the two examined periods. The signs and the 
magnitude of DF confirm the results obtained in our baseline digital analysis. Total earning assets 
(EARNAS) are significantly distorted upwards by 7.41 percent, 6.93 percent, and 6.53 percent for 
the non-problem, failed, and bailed out banks respectively in the pre-crisis era, and by 7.82 percent, 
                                                 
9 To calculate the z-statistic, we obtain the standard deviation of DF by following the computations found in Nigrini 
(1996)’s Appendix A. 
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9.30 percent, and 8.81 percent respectively in the crisis era. The same distortion scheme is 
documented for total interest income (INTINC) for all three bank types between the two examined 
periods. Further, a significant upward distortion of 7.42 percent in the pre-crisis period and 8.94 
percent in the crisis period is documented for non-interest income (NINTINC) for the bailed out 
banks. The core regulatory capital (TIER1) is found to be significantly upward manipulated by all 
three groups of banks in the crisis period, where the extent of distortion is higher for the problem 
banks. Moreover, loss loan allowances (ALLOW) are significantly downward distorted by failed 
and bailed out banks in the pre-crisis period (-5.94 percent and -6.20 percent, respectively), 
whereas the magnitude of distortion is higher in the crisis period (-8.53 percent and -7.64 percent, 
respectively). Loan loss provisions (LLP) are found to be distorted downwards by all banks across 
the two time periods. The reported distortion is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and is 
higher in the second period. The only difference we indicate between the results of our robustness 
analysis and those of digital analysis is that non-performing loans (NPL) are found to be 
manipulated downwards by the set of problem banks not only in the crisis period, but also in the 
pre-crisis period.  
         
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
     Excess accounting discretion and data tampering appear to have played a key role in the 
propagation and prolongation of the global financial crisis. In this paper, we aim to identify 
operational discrepancies and uncover manipulation practices among the failed, bailed out, and 
healthy banks in the recent crisis. We test whether and to what extent a set of fundamental balance 
sheet and income statement data were manipulated prior to and also after onset of the crisis. 
Towards this, we resort to the Benford’s Law distribution according to which low digits possess a 
greater probability of appearing in the first two positions within a number than high digits. If the 
digital frequency in the bank accounting data under scrutiny departs from the expectations of the 
Law, then we receive a strong signal of data manipulation. 
     Several interesting findings are reported in our baseline analysis and corroborated by the 
robustness checks we conduct. Our sample banks utilise loan loss provisions to manipulate 
earnings and interest income upwards throughout the examined two periods. In the case of bailed 
out banks, non-interest income, which is a key income component for this group of banks, is also 
found to be manipulated upwards in both time periods. Furthermore, together with loan loss 
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provisions, the set of problem banks resorts to the downward manipulation of allowance for loan 
losses and non-performing loans with the purpose to tamper earnings upwards. By manipulating 
loan loss provisions downwards, banks are inclined to follow the same or similar strategies with 
loan loss allowances in line with Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (FASB 1975), and, this 
provides them with the necessary ground to artificially increase the volume of earning assets they 
report on their balance sheets.  
     Our results provide evidence that manipulation is more prevalent in problem financial 
institutions. Weak banks manage income and earnings upwards by delaying loan loss provisions 
and, in turn, loss allowances and non-performing loans in order to conceal their financial 
difficulties. Managers of distressed banks are more anxious in demonstrating to authorities that 
they can attain the pre-specified performance thresholds. Moreover, a crucial prerequisite to obtain 
TARP assistance was viability. However, viability criterion was rather loosely defined and was 
related to profitability by many applicant banks. As a result, banks were incentivised to present to 
application reviewers higher revenue streams and cash flows than the actual ones.  
     We additionally find that manipulation is strengthened in the crisis period; it is also expanded 
during the crisis to affect bank regulatory capital. Admittedly, a bank has strong incentives to 
signal that it is not undercapitalised and that its capital is adequate to meet its obligations. To the 
extent that the allowance for loan losses is included in regulatory capital, banks can manipulate 
allowances downwards with the purpose to show that a strong capital cushion has been set aside 
to absorb shocks due to the financial turmoil. Also, accounting discretion which is inherent in the 
current financial reporting rules allow banks to manipulate regulatory capital upwards by holding 
back on loan loss provisioning and by keeping their allowances for losses from ballooning. In sum, 
accounting discretion enables banking firms with impaired assets to satisfy the capital adequacy 
requirements, but renders the assessment of the true health of banks problematic. 
     Empirical results suggests that banks manipulate balance sheet and income statement variables 
upwards when their level is slightly below a round number. In a similar vein, banks exercise a 
downward manipulation when the level of the relevant variables is slightly above a round number. 
That is, banks utilise data manipulation to disclose an artificially improved view of their 
performance to authorities and investors without yet resorting to eye-catching manipulation 
strategies that may attract the scrutiny by regulators. Nevertheless, accounting data manipulation 
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yields a distorted view of the financial conditions and the health of banks, providing evidence of 
regulatory forbearance and non-compliance with the accounting rules and standards. 
     In sum, manipulation decreases the reliability of bank accounting information, erodes 
confidence, and, in turn, has a devastating effect on the credibility of financial institutions. It is, 
therefore, crucial for regulatory and supervisory authorities to find ways to reduce data 
manipulation. Our results call for a more in-depth evaluation of the quality of the bank accounting 
information by applying a Benford’s Law-based analysis to detect manipulation in the banking 
industry. The proposed empirical analysis appears to be a systematic method suitable for assessing 
the quality of accounting information and for discovering irregularities in the data of financial 
statements. It can thus assist the authorities in mitigating the phenomenon of data manipulation 
both under normal economic and financial conditions, but also during financial debacles when the 
phenomenon is exaggerated.  
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TABLE 3 
Digital Frequencies of CAMEL Components for Non-problem Banks in the Pre-crisis Period 
 
 
Non-problem banks  
(obs=6,302)            
  
EQUITY 
n=118,939 
TIER1 
n=118,801 
NPL 
n=117,592 
ALLOW 
n=118,671 
LLP 
n=116,805 
LOANS 
n=119,362 
DEPOS 
n=119,430 
EARNAS 
n=119,265 
INTINC 
n=119,382 
NINTINC 
n=119,270 
CASH 
n=119,320 
REPOS 
n=116,846 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0031 
0.44 
0.0147 
1.33 
-0.0105 
-1.28 
-0.0053 
-0.85 
-0.0414 
  -1.87* 
0.0082 
0.73 
0.0041 
0.85 
0.0488 
   2.08** 
0.0556 
   2.30** 
0.0281 
1.39 
-0.0032 
-0.84 
0.0040 
0.49 
1 .1139 0.0021 
0.49 
0.0115 
0.92 
-0.0074 
-1.12 
0.0046 
0.94 
-0.0208 
-1.30 
-0.0048 
-0.94 
0.0039 
0.67 
0.0374 
   1.98** 
0.0395 
  1.74* 
0.0216 
1.30 
0.0029 
0.41 
-0.0038 
-0.62 
2 .1088 0.0014 
0.36 
-0.0028 
-1.10 
0.0079 
1.18 
0.0037 
1.05 
0.0122 
0.95 
-0.0049 
-1.08 
0.0032 
0.84 
0.0137 
 1.39 
-0.0192 
-1.10 
0.0142 
1.14 
0.0010 
0.23 
-0.0022 
-0.48 
3 .1043 -0.0052 
-0.60 
0.0023 
1.17 
0.0061 
1.05 
-0.0044 
-1.08 
0.0109 
0.67 
0.0033 
0.40 
0.0018 
0.57 
-0.0125 
-1.20 
0.0153 
 1.28 
-0.0049 
-0.95 
0.0004 
0.49 
0.0020 
0.93 
4 .1003 -0.0023 
-0.37 
0.0016 
0.68 
0.0053 
0.95 
-0.0035 
-1.14 
-0.0075 
-1.26 
-0.0031 
-0.98 
-0.0019 
-0.70 
-0.0108 
-1.19 
0.0042 
 1.13 
-0.0051 
-0.99 
-0.0029 
-0.58 
0.0014 
0.61 
5 .0967 0.0019 
0.43 
0.0014 
0.72 
-0.0054 
-1.02 
-0.0023 
-0.85 
-0.0053 
-1.18 
0.0020 
0.97 
-0.0011 
-0.85 
0.0095 
 0.98 
0.0039 
 1.06 
-0.0004 
-1.17 
0.0012 
0.92 
0.0008 
0.42 
6 .0934 0.0030 
0.61 
-0.0022 
-0.58 
-0.0069 
-0.93 
0.0057 
1.11 
0.0061 
1.04 
0.0019 
1.08 
-0.0006 
-0.44 
0.0084 
 0.69 
0.0044 
 1.02 
0.0013 
0.62 
0.0020 
1.04 
0.0004 
0.67 
7 .0904 -0.0039 
-0.28 
-0.0018 
-0.69 
0.0089 
1.05 
0.0096 
1.08 
0.0116 
1.17 
0.0062 
0.83 
0.0017 
0.87 
-0.0083 
-1.15 
0.0098 
 1.16 
-0.0040 
-1.16 
-0.0039 
-0.62 
-0.0014 
-1.02 
8 .0876 -0.0045 
-0.44 
-0.0130 
-1.14 
0.0094 
1.07 
0.0129 
0.64 
0.00125 
1.04 
0.093 
0.99 
0.0030 
0.93 
-0.0264 
   -1.76* 
-0.0256 
   -2.05** 
-0.0032 
-1.03 
-0.0040 
-0.51 
-0.0027 
-0.94 
9 .0850 0.0059 
0.33 
-0.0141 
-0.93 
0.0101 
1.18 
0.0148 
1.22 
0.0452 
    1.98** 
0.0099 
0.56 
-0.0058 
-1.04 
-0.0608 
    -2.31** 
-0.0718 
   -2.26** 
-0.0153 
-1.40 
-0.0103 
-1.02 
-0.0049 
-0.88 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   2.49 5.18 4.93 6.09 15.19* 3.92 3.68 17.48** 18.19** 9.31 5.30 2.90 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place of each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the non-problem banks over the pre-crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each 
digit and for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described 
in Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Digital Frequencies of CAMEL Components for Failed Banks in the Pre-crisis Period 
 
 
Failed banks  
(obs=449)            
  
EQUITY 
n=8,190 
TIER1 
n=8,036 
NPL 
n=7,592 
ALLOW 
n=7,920 
LLP 
n=7,633 
LOANS 
n=8,394 
DEPOS 
n=8,402 
EARNAS 
n=8,328 
INTINC 
n=8,439 
NINTINC 
n=8,421 
CASH 
n=8,296 
REPOS 
n=7,146 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0163 
1.04 
0.0344 
1.20 
-0.0310 
-1.33 
-0.0682 
    -2.31** 
-0.0571 
   -1.99** 
0.0043 
0.65 
-0.0069 
-0.43 
0.0632 
  2.12** 
0.0730 
   2.41** 
0.0382 
1.51 
-0.0096 
-1.20 
0.0184 
1.03 
1 .1139 0.0103 
1.11 
0.0219 
1.43 
-0.0206 
-1.42 
-0.0201 
-1.44 
0.0093 
1.28 
0.0034 
0.70 
-0.0043 
-0.39 
0.0459 
   2.05** 
0.0476 
   2.18** 
-0.0403 
-0.96 
-0.0042 
-1.02 
0.0128 
1.21 
2 .1088 0.0053 
1.16 
-0.0226 
-1.03 
-0.0131 
-1.20 
-0.0130 
-1.39 
0.0032 
1.17 
0.0032 
0.27 
0.0025 
0.93 
0.0208 
 1.43 
0.0202 
 1.49 
-0.0329 
-1.17 
0.0053 
0.67 
-0.0094 
-0.52 
3 .1043 0.0031 
0.94 
-0.0094 
-1.13 
0.0127 
1.29 
0.0083 
 1.32 
0.0014 
0.91 
0.0017 
0.93 
0.0021 
0.68 
0.0121 
 1.29 
-0.0218 
-1.10 
0.0102 
0.54 
0.0039 
0.78 
-0.0048 
-0.71 
4 .1003 -0.0023 
-0.99 
0.0048 
0.99 
0.0114 
0.69 
0.0057 
 1.20 
-0.0010 
-0.73 
-0.0011 
-1.10 
0.0028 
0.44 
-0.0054 
-1.38 
-0.0094 
-1.29 
0.0065 
0.70 
0.0008 
0.45 
0.0016 
0.34 
5 .0967 -0.0014 
-1.18 
0.0037 
1.06 
0.0086 
0.43 
-0.0021 
-0.95 
0.0009 
1.05 
0.0007 
1.04 
0.0020 
0.59 
-0.0032 
-0.76 
0.0048 
 0.85 
0.0032 
1.05 
0.0004 
1.12 
0.0003 
1.10 
6 .0934 0.0020 
0.43 
0.0022 
0.38 
-0.0039 
-0.53 
0.0019 
 1.36 
-0.0018 
-0.63 
-0.0011 
-1.15 
-0.0039 
-1.05 
0.0048 
 1.02 
0.0032 
 1.18 
0.0033 
0.64 
-0.0055 
-0.53 
-0.0011 
-0.74 
7 .0904 0.0038 
0.75 
-0.0029 
-1.15 
0.0140 
1.18 
0.0203 
 1.16 
-0.0020 
-0.87 
0.0028 
0.57 
-0.0032 
-1.18 
-0.0105 
-1.38 
-0.0097 
-1.39 
0.0095 
1.18 
-0.0126 
-1.10 
0.0040 
1.32 
8 .0876 0.0096 
1.09 
-0.0174 
-1.38 
0.0232 
1.39 
0.0241 
 1.54 
0.0082 
1.38 
0.0039 
1.12 
0.0040 
0.62 
-0.0319 
 -1.84* 
-0.0425 
   -2.28** 
-0.0153 
-1.02 
0.0153 
0.83 
0.0111 
1.29 
9 .0850 -0.0149 
-0.85 
-0.0351 
-1.49 
0.0288 
1.51 
0.0574 
     2.45** 
0.0489 
  1.94* 
0.0045 
1.04 
0.0048 
1.04 
-0.0841 
   -2.34** 
-0.0822 
   -2.49** 
-0.0228 
-1.44 
0.0188 
0.99 
0.0173 
0.42 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   4.62 9.31 10.74 18.34**  17.19** 3.88 3.51 18.94** 19.88** 6.93 2.76 2.62 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the failed banks over the pre-crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each digit 
and for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Digital Frequencies of CAMEL Components for Bailed Out Banks in the Pre-crisis Period 
 
 
Bailed out banks  
(obs=824 )            
  
EQUITY 
n=14,830 
TIER1 
n=14,918 
NPL 
n=14,142 
ALLOW 
n=14,721 
LLP 
n=14,008 
LOANS 
n=15,210 
DEPOS 
n=15,328 
EARNAS 
n=15,275 
INTINC 
n=15,402 
NINTINC 
n=15,426 
CASH 
n=15,224 
REPOS 
n=13,951 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0176 
1.34 
0.0272 
1.41 
-0.0352 
-1.20 
-0.0662 
    -2.14** 
-0.0793 
  -2.09** 
0.0132 
1.18 
-0.0105 
-0.86 
0.0671 
  2.39** 
0.0732 
     2.69*** 
0.0820 
   2.34** 
0.0103 
0.54 
0.0081 
1.16 
1 .1139 0.0098 
1.17 
0.0238 
1.32 
-0.0198 
-1.31 
-0.0170 
 -1.38 
-0.0094 
-1.55 
0.0087 
1.12 
-0.0094 
-0.94 
0.0391 
   1.73* 
0.0390 
     2.13** 
0.0346 
  1.69* 
0.0087 
0.67 
0.0052 
1.05 
2 .1088 0.0072 
1.23 
0.0170 
1.21 
-0.0149 
-1.28 
-0.0094 
-1.56 
-0.0086 
-1.48 
0.0034 
0.80 
-0.0053 
-1.12 
0.0157 
 1.31 
0.0136 
  1.22 
-0.0125 
-0.85 
-0.0094 
-1.05 
0.0027 
0.43 
3 .1043 -0.0041 
-0.84 
-0.0115 
-0.89 
-0.0102 
-0.95 
-0.0062 
 -0.49 
0.0051 
 1.04 
-0.0021 
-0.56 
0.0068 
1.24 
-0.0059 
 -1.33 
-0.0067 
-0.93 
-0.0062 
-0.68 
-0.0060 
-1.21 
-0.0034 
-0.87 
4 .1003 -0.0031 
-0.99 
0.0102 
1.18 
0.0061 
0.86 
0.0027 
  0.83 
0.0019 
 0.88 
-0.0012 
-0.69 
0.0023 
1.15 
-0.0038 
-0.61 
-0.0051 
-1.17 
0.0035 
 0.31 
0.0039 
0.50 
-0.0028 
-1.16 
5 .0967 -0.0022 
-1.05 
-0.0008 
-0.48 
0.0048 
0.22 
-0.0017 
-1.14 
-0.0012 
-0.76 
-0.0003 
-0.97 
-0.0011 
-0.38 
-0.0021 
-0.83 
0.0021 
  0.96 
0.0028 
 0.63 
0.0021 
0.87 
0.0032 
1.37 
6 .0934 0.0084 
0.59 
0.0014 
1.07 
0.0031 
1.05 
-0.0011 
 -1.23 
-0.0009 
-0.97 
0.0075 
0.62 
0.0076 
1.27 
0.0015 
 1.25 
-0.0048 
 -1.00 
0.0022 
 1.17 
-0.0009 
-1.04 
0.0039 
1.41 
7 .0904 0.0096 
1.14 
-0.0114 
-1.22 
-0.0101 
-0.74 
0.0119 
  1.30 
0.0044 
 1.29 
0.0086 
1.10 
0.0088 
1.15 
-0.0116 
-1.30 
-0.0105 
-1.18 
-0.0173 
 -1.29 
-0.0028 
-0.63 
0.0047 
0.78 
8 .0876 0.0101 
0.78 
-0.0249 
-1.41 
0.0160 
1.41 
0.0284 
  1.27 
0.0084 
1.40 
0.0104 
1.21 
0.0091 
1.22 
-0.0261 
 -1.78* 
-0.0342 
   -1.79* 
-0.0259 
  -1.84* 
0.0070 
1.38 
-0.0109 
-1.11 
9 .0850 0.0126 
1.30 
-0.0308 
-1.33 
0.0387 
1.44 
0.0620 
     2.49** 
0.0738 
    2.32** 
0.0132 
1.32 
-0.0094 
0.75 
-0.0858 
   -2.36** 
-0.0916 
    -2.55** 
-0.0782 
   -2.41** 
0.0106 
0.92 
-0.0125 
-0.94 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   3.19 10.83 9.17    17.55**    17.93** 3.05 3.48    17.27**     20.07**     18.05** 3.58 4.01 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the bailed out banks over the pre-crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each 
digit and for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described 
in Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Digital Frequencies of CAMEL Components for Non-problem Banks in the Crisis Period 
 
 
Non-problem banks  
(obs=6,302)            
  
EQUITY 
n=130,948 
TIER1 
n=130,924 
NPL 
n=130,271 
ALLOW 
n=130,751 
LLP 
n=130,337 
LOANS 
n=131,284 
DEPOS 
n=131,382 
EARNAS 
n=131,208 
INTINC 
n=131,527 
NINTINC 
n=131,534 
CASH 
n=131,429 
REPOS 
n=129,892 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0053 
0.49 
0.0498 
   1.93* 
-0.0096 
-1.13 
-0.0067 
-1.04 
-0.0582 
   -2.12** 
0.0079 
0.90 
0.0054 
0.81 
0.0592 
   2.32** 
0.0641 
     2.69*** 
0.0305 
1.44 
-0.0041 
-1.05 
0.0053 
0.61 
1 .1139 0.0034 
0.40 
0.0162 
 1.42 
-0.0083 
-1.07 
0.0052 
0.81 
-0.0164 
-1.55 
-0.0048 
-0.61 
0.0042 
0.93 
0.0457 
   2.01** 
0.0438 
  1.85* 
0.0192 
1.40 
0.0037 
0.56 
-0.0059 
-0.77 
2 .1088 0.0022 
0.31 
-0.0034 
-1.03 
0.0068 
1.10 
0.0037 
0.93 
0.0133 
1.14 
-0.0037 
-0.73 
0.0030 
1.05 
0.0170 
 1.22 
0.0203 
 1.25 
0.0091 
0.89 
0.0048 
0.39 
-0.0041 
-0.55 
3 .1043 -0.0062 
-0.78 
0.0028 
 0.95 
0.0032 
0.94 
-0.0024 
-0.92 
0.0117 
0.81 
0.0034 
0.96 
0.0017 
0.76 
-0.0103 
-1.12 
0.0102 
 0.97 
-0.0074 
-1.04 
0.0009 
0.56 
0.0018 
1.15 
4 .1003 -0.0037 
-0.45 
0.0014 
 0.74 
0.0021 
1.10 
-0.0025 
-1.03 
-0.0084 
-1.18 
-0.0028 
-1.01 
-0.0018 
-0.82 
-0.0089 
-0.93 
0.0056 
 1.28 
-0.0042 
-0.73 
-0.0017 
-0.70 
0.0007 
0.59 
5 .0967 0.0028 
0.46 
0.0010 
 0.83 
-0.0034 
-0.89 
-0.0010 
-1.01 
-0.0041 
-0.94 
0.0052 
0.88 
-0.0011 
-1.10 
0.0063 
 1.16 
0.0024 
 1.10 
-0.0019 
-0.67 
0.0008 
1.02 
0.0004 
0.69 
6 .0934 0.0021 
0.74 
-0.0020 
-0.65 
-0.0047 
-1.05 
0.0038 
0.89 
0.0072 
1.19 
0.0068 
1.05 
-0.0008 
-0.59 
0.0042 
 1.04 
0.0052 
 0.79 
0.0010 
0.77 
0.0033 
0.87 
0.0012 
0.84 
7 .0904 -0.0052 
-0.21 
-0.0031 
-0.88 
0.0078 
1.16 
0.0076 
1.17 
0.0131 
0.94 
0.0082 
0.88 
0.0024 
0.76 
0.0067 
0.91 
0.0104 
 0.83 
-0.0035 
-0.82 
-0.0028 
-0.54 
-0.0011 
-0.93 
8 .0876 -0.0046 
-0.35 
-0.0114 
-1.29 
0.0107 
0.88 
0.0104 
0.52 
0.0133 
1.47 
0.0094 
1.02 
0.0041 
1.07 
-0.0305 
   -1.84* 
-0.0278 
  -1.76* 
-0.0168 
-1.16 
-0.0052 
-0.69 
-0.0020 
-1.03 
9 .0850 0.0060 
0.32 
-0.0517 
   -2.06** 
0.0136 
1.24 
0.0125 
1.33 
0.0569 
   2.01** 
0.0103 
1.14 
-0.0050 
-0.96 
-0.0737 
    -2.47** 
-0.0869 
    -3.08*** 
-0.0273 
-1.37 
-0.0087 
-1.16 
-0.0056 
-0.71 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   3.16 14.93* 5.27 5.82  17.56** 4.31 3.79 19.04** 19.95** 9.60 6.18 3.37 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the non-problem banks over the crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each digit 
and for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Digital Frequencies of CAMEL Components for Failed Banks in the Crisis Period 
 
 
Failed banks  
(obs = 449)            
  
EQUITY 
n=9,115 
TIER1 
n=9,093 
NPL 
n=8,830 
ALLOW 
n=9,064 
LLP 
n=8,792 
LOANS 
n=9,306 
DEPOS 
n=9,328 
EARNAS 
n=9,293 
INTINC 
n=9,361 
NINTINC 
n=9,340 
CASH 
n=9,305 
REPOS 
n=8,603 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0178 
1.21 
0.0582 
    2.05** 
-0.0704 
   -2.16** 
-0.0894 
    -2.71*** 
-0.0692 
  -2.36** 
0.0051 
0.77 
-0.0078 
-0.57 
0.0829 
  2.42** 
0.0788 
     3.29*** 
0.0274 
1.39 
-0.0082 
-0.78 
-0.0143 
-0.64 
1 .1139 0.0096 
0,87 
0.0163 
1.51 
-0.0140 
-1.36 
-0.0242 
-1.59 
-0.0087 
-0.96 
0.0042 
1.04 
-0.0060 
-0.44 
0.0461 
   2.08** 
0.0502 
   2.31** 
0.0188 
1.20 
-0.0055 
-0.89 
0.0111 
0.96 
2 .1088 0.0099 
1.10 
0.0098 
0.65 
-0.0084 
-1.12 
-0.0096 
-1.27 
0.0058 
0.89 
0.0030 
0.20 
-0.0039 
-1.15 
0.0163 
 1.31 
0.0173 
 1.30 
-0.0204 
-0.96 
0.0040 
1.04 
-0.0060 
-0.78 
3 .1043 0.0048 
1.23 
-0.0104 
-1.12 
-0.0102 
-0.47 
0.0080 
 0.97 
0.0023 
1.02 
0.0027 
1.12 
0.0046 
0.71 
0.0100 
 0.99 
-0.0187 
-0.86 
0.0163 
0.69 
0.0027 
1.18 
-0.0031 
-1.04 
4 .1003 -0.0056 
-1.04 
0.0059 
0.75 
0.0021 
0.77 
0.0063 
 0.81 
-0.0009 
-1.01 
-0.0008 
-0.89 
0.0038 
0.79 
-0.0067 
-1.20 
0.0112 
0.68 
0.0078 
1.07 
0.0013 
0.64 
0.0019 
0.69 
5 .0967 -0.0028 
-0.89 
0.0020 
0.97 
0.0038 
1.13 
-0.0080 
-1.03 
0.0012 
0.87 
0.0012 
0.99 
0.0020 
0.74 
-0.0019 
-0.80 
0.0086 
 1.03 
0.0049 
0.61 
0.0010 
0.89 
0.0012 
0.98 
6 .0934 0.0035 
0.62 
0.0009 
0.59 
-0.0059 
-1.00 
0.0028 
 1.08 
-0.0014 
-1.09 
-0.0023 
-1.02 
-0.0012 
-0.86 
0.0058 
 0.81 
0.0090 
 0.78 
0.0028 
0.99 
-0.0101 
-1.19 
0.0008 
-1.26 
7 .0904 0.0049 
1.13 
-0.0055 
-1.01 
0.0104 
1.27 
0.0163 
 0.86 
-0.0034 
-1.15 
0.0034 
0.69 
-0.0041 
-1.10 
-0.0096 
-1.12 
-0.0102 
-1.24 
0.0051 
0.52 
-0.0092 
-0.85 
0.0031 
0.86 
8 .0876 0.0111 
0.92 
-0.0198 
-1.49 
0.0188 
1.50 
0.0199 
 1.50 
0.0073 
1.40 
0.0036 
0.87 
0.0052 
1.03 
-0.0350 
 -1.75* 
-0.0412 
   -2.36** 
-0.0104 
-1.21 
0.0122 
1.06 
0.0076 
0.64 
9 .0850 -0.0158 
-1.20 
-0.0548 
   -2.36** 
0.0673 
    2.02** 
0.0914 
     2.49** 
0.0648 
  2.39** 
0.0056 
0.91 
0.0060 
0.88 
-0.0918 
   -2.27** 
-0.0898 
   -2.40** 
-0.0233 
-1.30 
0.0124 
1.17 
0.0103 
1.29 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   5.17     16.98**     17.20**    23.78**   19.25** 3.26 4.08 18.03**    24.39*** 5.80 4.29 3.38 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the failed banks over the crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each digit and 
for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Digital Frequencies for Bailed Out Banks in the Crisis Period 
 
 
Bailed out banks  
(obs = 824)            
  
EQUITY 
n=16,782 
TIER1 
n=16,690 
NPL 
n=15,984 
ALLOW 
n=16,572 
LLP 
n=15,793 
LOANS 
n=17,102 
DEPOS 
n=17,086 
EARNAS 
n=17,025 
INTINC 
n=17,190 
NINTINC 
n=17,118 
CASH 
n=12,345 
REPOS 
n=15,648 
Digit Expected 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
Observed 
deviation 
(z-statistic) 
0 .1197 0.0196 
1.22 
0.0532 
  1.75* 
-0.0744 
    -2.17** 
-0.0803 
    -2.37** 
-0.0882 
    -2.31** 
0.0080 
1.25 
0.0095 
1.22 
0.0794 
     3.19*** 
0.0778 
     3.15*** 
0.0873 
   2.41** 
0.0079 
1.15 
0.0102 
0.99 
1 .1139 0.0102 
1.08 
0.0244 
1.41 
-0.0261 
-1.48 
-0.0194 
 -1.50 
-0.0142 
-1.24 
0.0056 
0.87 
-0.0102 
-1.04 
0.0305 
   1.99** 
0.0376 
     2.34** 
0.0355 
  2.06** 
0.0053 
1.02 
0.0065 
1.37 
2 .1088 0.0051 
1.06 
0.0109 
0.94 
-0.0108 
-0.96 
-0.0105 
-1.26 
-0.0100 
-1.38 
0.0023 
1.02 
-0.0104 
-0.85 
0.0104 
 1.20 
0.0083 
  1.36 
-0.0089 
-1.04 
-0.0067 
-0.38 
0.0014 
0.38 
3 .1043 -0.0064 
-1.11 
0.0086 
1.23 
-0.082 
-1.01 
-0.0093 
 -1.02 
-0.0065 
 0.78 
-0.0038 
-0.53 
0.0051 
0.78 
-0.0063 
 -0.85 
0.0050 
 0.31 
-0.0058 
-0.96 
-0.0050 
-0.59 
-0.0026 
-1.02 
4 .1003 -0.0048 
-0.82 
-0.0097 
-0.82 
0.0096 
0.72 
0.0009 
  0.33 
0.0023 
 0.59 
-0.0026 
-0.70 
0.0034 
0.96 
-0.0048 
-0.79 
-0.0057 
-0.71 
-0.0033 
 -0.40 
0.0018 
0.68 
-0.0017 
-0.48 
5 .0967 -0.0019 
-0.70 
-0.0021 
-0.33 
0.0037 
1.17 
-0.0008 
-0.84 
-0.0009 
-1.03 
-0.0012 
-1.15 
-0.0023 
-0.67 
-0.0013 
-1.01 
0.0007 
  1.26 
0.0004 
 1.28 
0.0010 
1.05 
0.0006 
1.40 
6 .0934 0.0059 
0.64 
0.0038 
0.70 
0.064 
1.26 
0.0043 
 -0.92 
-0.0014 
-1.12 
0.0044 
0.51 
0.0052 
1.12 
0.0029 
 0.97 
-0.0035 
 -1.04 
0.0035 
 0.49 
-0.0006 
-0.82 
0.0034 
0.87 
7 .0904 0.0108 
1.30 
-0.0085 
-1.05 
0.0108 
-0.99 
0.0126 
  1.12 
0.0068 
 1.17 
0.0072 
0.87 
0.0074 
1.02 
-0.0090 
-1.22 
-0.0087 
-0.96 
-0.0104 
 -1.33 
-0.0021 
-0.78 
0.0040 
0.61 
8 .0876 0.0119 
0.82 
-0.0209 
-1.46 
0.0192 
1.51 
0.0205 
  1.48 
0.0138 
1.32 
0.0096 
1.04 
0.0088 
0.95 
-0.0278 
   -2.15** 
-0.0382 
    -1.97** 
-0.0280 
    -2.24** 
0.0064 
1.20 
-0.0094 
-0.78 
9 .0850 0.0132 
1.41 
-0.0570 
  -1.99** 
0.0787 
   2.11** 
0.0762 
     3.04*** 
0.0894 
    2.49** 
0.0101 
0.99 
-0.0097 
1.26 
-0.0924 
    -3.38*** 
-0.0938 
    -2.56** 
-0.0901 
     -2.49** 
0.0091 
1.35 
-0.0103 
-1.11 
              
𝝌(𝟗)
𝟐   4.34   15.11*    17.16**    23.71***  19.81** 2.86 2.97    24.96**    23.17***    22.70*** 5.07 4.55 
The first column of the Table lists all ten digits that are likely to appear in the second place each of the examined CAMEL components, while the expected frequencies of appearance for each 
digit determined by the Benford’s Law are presented in the second column. Columns 3 to 14 report the observed deviations between the actual and the expected frequencies for each of the 
examined variables for the bailed out banks over the crisis era.  The values of the z-statistic and the corresponding significance levels are presented below the observed deviation for each digit 
and for each variable under scrutiny. The value of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is reported for each variable in the last row of the Table. All variables and their data sources are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Distortion Factor Model Results 
 
  EQUITY TIER1 NPL ALLOW LLP LOANS DEPOS EARNAS INTINC NINTINC CASH REPOS 
  
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
DF 
(z-statistic) 
Panel A:  
Pre-crisis period 
            
Non-problem banks 
(obs = 6,302) 
 1.61 
 0.49 
1.33 
1.06 
-0.78 
-0.50 
-2.38 
-1.46 
-3.19 
  -1.72* 
-1.42 
-1.08 
 0.73 
 1.17 
7.41 
  1.78* 
5.31 
   2.14** 
-1.01 
-0.47 
 0.75 
 1.27 
0.89 
0.55 
             
Failed banks 
(obs = 448) 
-1.05 
-0.67 
2.11 
1.18 
-2.95 
 -1.80* 
-5.94 
    -2.27** 
 -3.51 
    -1.96** 
2.19 
0.64 
 1.59 
 1.41 
6.93 
    2.40** 
7.89 
    2.35** 
1.18 
1.50 
-1.08 
-0.79 
1.64 
1.30 
             
Bailed out banks 
(obs = 815) 
 1.89 
 1.04 
1.97 
0.85 
-3.76 
  -1.93* 
-6.20 
  -1.91* 
-6.63 
    -2.38** 
1.53 
0.78 
-2.08 
-0.75 
6.53 
     2.68*** 
6.21 
    2.14** 
7.42 
  1.86* 
-1.33 
-1.10 
0.82 
1.25 
              
Panel B:  
Crisis period 
            
Non-problem banks 
(obs = 6,302) 
 1.90 
 0.52 
5.89 
  1.74* 
-1.38 
-0.72 
-3.58 
-1.60 
-3.85 
 -1.94* 
-2.37 
-1.19 
1.64 
1.29 
7.82 
    1.97** 
5.12 
    2.08** 
-0.75 
-0.50 
 0.38 
 1.45 
1.38 
1.06 
             
Failed banks 
(obs = 448) 
-2.19 
-0.58 
7.41 
  1.85* 
-6.44 
  -1.91* 
-8.53 
    -2.42** 
-4.98 
    -2.31** 
1.42 
0.76 
2.06 
0.98 
9.30 
     3.17*** 
8.75 
    2.48** 
 1.39 
 1.28 
-0.96 
-0.59 
2.16 
1.48 
             
Bailed out banks 
(obs = 815) 
 2.30 
 1.21 
8.09 
    2.27** 
-6.79 
    -2.04** 
-7.64 
    -2.10** 
-7.53 
    -2.17** 
1.90 
0.92 
-1.50 
-1.31 
8.81 
     2.80*** 
6.93 
     3.61*** 
8.94 
    2.31** 
-2.00 
-1.29 
0.77 
1.14 
This Table displays the DF values in percentage terms for each of the examined CAMEL components for the non-problem, failed, and bailed out banks. The values of the z-statistic and the 
corresponding significance levels are presented below the DF values. The results in Panel A refer to the pre-crisis era, which extends from 2003q1 to 2008q2. The results in Panel B refer to the 
crisis era, which extends from 2008q3 to 2012q4. To account for possible selection bias in our data, we exclude all the outliers from the sets of failed and bailed out banks. All variables and their 
data sources are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
